A report published in 2019 by Small Arms Survey states that African non-state actors (civilians, business entities, and armed groups) are estimated to hold in excess of 40 million small and light weapons – SALW. Fewer than 6 million of those arms (about 15%) are registered. The state actors, by contrast, are estimated to possess fewer than 11 million such arms. In light of this statement, African non-state actors hold more SALW than state actors. 85% of the unregistered arms in this case are categorized as illicit armaments obtained through diversion and illegal arms trading in the region.
While many causes are enshrining transnational trafficking in arms, sitting on their most aggressive end are Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs), and state involvement through rogue state-actors. TCOs are covertly thriving and are powerfully sustained by well-connected moles in the grand schemes of power. At the same time, rogue-state authorities are obviously the most dominant brokers of such organized crime. Tribal/civil wars, the exponential rate of Africa’s youthful population-related crimes, and accidental diversions are among the other notable causes.
My investigative research observes a swathe of evolving factors that are hugely contributing to the escalation of this sort of transnational crime in Africa. From robust terrorist networks to remote intertribal wars. Terrorism, however, remains a readily available lucrative market for illicit arms, most of which come through:
● Rogue state actors in charge of armaments and their transit links.
● Attack of poorly defended or remotely stationed armories.
● Attack of the weakest links during arms transit from exporting states.
● Insufficient risk assessment before dispatching arms from the exporting states.
It is hard to mention Transnational Crime Organizations without, in fact, factoring in terrorism. Though the two are differently structured, they supplement and underpin each other. They are strongly affiliated. More often, TCOs, other than the illicit arms, provide radical terrorist networks with a trove of information and the much-needed illicit fuel to keep their operations afloat. Cases of accidental transfers of arms also answer to the call of transnational trafficking in arms, though many of such go unrecorded. A patrol unit can, for instance, forfeit a fleet of heavily armed trucks in the event of a looming substantial threat. One of such cases was noted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as: “…close to Multinational Joint Task Force Zone of operations, there was a reported incident involving a Nigerian patrol that abandoned its vehicles as they were running out of gas…”
At the time, the patrol unit was vulnerable to the heavily armed Boko Haram militia. In (mostly) Sahelian and the Horn of Africa’s pastoral belts, TCOs deploy a tactic of using nomads to transport arms to designated recipients. Naturally, it could be assumed that a task worth attracting a risk of that magnitude requires a sort of daredevil individual to execute.
In such cases, TCOs successfully use individuals deemed less suspicious. The likes of children, women and the elderly. This same approach is also applied in the coastal and lake regions, where fishermen are used to transport illegal arms in their fishing nets underneath. Warlords, especially in intertribal warring regions, have been noted to exchange rounds of munitions and rifles, such as AKs and M16s, with cows. The Small Arms Survey reported that 500 rounds of munitions at the time were exchanged with one cow. Spillover effects from war zones are also crucial in the wave of trafficking illicit arms. TCOs highly prey on crises.
The art of finding the order of business within the raging circles of chaos. Such a notable example is when the NATO-led intervention in Libya during the Arab Spring yielded devastating spillover effects after heavily armed warring militias attacked armories and made away with a stockpile of conventional arms. A staggering fraction of those armaments reportedly found their way to many countries in the Sahel, which is infamously known to be one of the most hostile zones of terrorism.
Campaigns for disarmament have been sadly met by their own share of obstructions. Much as various governments could be inclined to take a coercive disarmament approach, civil rights groups conflict with such an approach and are advocating for ad hoc disarmament campaigns, instead. However, the latter is not yielding results proportionate to the threat. Arms recovered from such campaigns are just a small cog in the big wheel. A significant portion of illicit arms is military-grade. In cases such as this, many such illicit arms holders are hesitant to hand them over to state authorities for fear of further interrogations, at best, or, at worst, torture, and crippling legal implications. Coercive disarmament, to a great degree, is an approach that even various governments are afraid of taking due to high chances of extreme collateral damage, especially in densely populated or militia-controlled areas. This leaves room for a more cordial approach, which, of course, is not as promising.
While disarmament campaigns still echo loudly, it is very fundamental that state authorities should impose stricter conditions to allow individuals and business entities to possess firearms and munitions legally. The state itself should firmly punish state involvement in transnational trafficking in arms. Government authorities should hold their rogue state actors severely accountable for this matter and have them face, without partiality, the full wrath of the law.
As far as the public goes, freedom is indeed good. But very costly to a certain extent, especially in matters of national or regional security. Software capable of infiltrating military installations or critical infrastructure, such as CCTV networks, should not, by any means, be in the public domain, especially in this AI era. The government should restrict the private sector’s purchases of such software or AI tools, including purchases by defense contractors. The responsibility to curb this threat is with both the public and the government. More apparently, it is with the government. Nonetheless, we each have a role to play. Otherwise, it is hard to deny that a bulge of foreseeable danger is already imminent and yet to burst from within. The risk of escalation cannot be avoided if the pages are allowed to turn as they may.